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Introduction
In the years following the end of World War II, precision machines became one of Japan’s main 
exports to the world market. While heavy industry was restructuring and several other sectors were 
geared to the domestic market, there was strong growth in the export of precision machines, designed 
to bring in the foreign currencies necessary for rebuilding the country’s economy.1 
* This work was supported by Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellow (21?09015). I wish to thank Minoru Sawai (Osaka 
University) for his comments and advice. In this paper, the names of persons appear following the usage in Japan, that 
is, with the family name preceding the fi rst name.
† JSPS Postdoctoral Fellow, Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University
1 On the history of the Japanese precision machine industry, see Sawai Minoru, “Paneru hokoku: 1950-60 nendai no 
keikikai kogyo: kozo to yakuwari”, Keieishigaku, Vol. 41 No. 4 (2007), pp. 35-40 and Nihon no keikikai kogyo, Tokyo: 
MITI, 1958.
Abstract
This paper focuses on the contribution of university professors to the development of the 
Japanese precision machine industry (watches, cameras, sewing machines). They played a 
key role in this process, at first while training a new generation of production engineers who 
were hired after the war by precision machine firms, but also through their research on the 
improvement of the quality of machine tools and the precision of parts. The present article 
focuses on two professors of the Department for Arms Production (zohei gakka; renamed the 
Department of Precision Engineering after 1945, seimitsu kikai kogakka) of the University of 
Tokyo, Aoki Tamotsu and Okoshi Makoto, both of whom were instrumental in modernizing 
companies in the precision machine industry between 1930 and 1960.
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1937 1950 1955 1960 1965
Sewing machines 6.9 96.9 70.1 45.9 34.6
Cameras 9.6 18.1 16.7 28.8 39.9
Watches 1.4 5.5 0.7 1.5 15.8
Source: Dainihon gaikoku boeki, 1937-1965 (exports); Kogyo tokeihyo, 1937-1965 (production)
Note: 1939 instead of 1937 for sewing machines (they are not included in the offi cial production surveys before 1939)
The arrival of these products on the world market occurred gradually, at fi rst with sewing machines, 
from the end of the 1940s onwards, then cameras, in the 1950s, and fi nally watches, in the 1960s (see 
table 1). These various sectors had their own dynamics, characterized notably by a tendency towards 
withdrawal to the domestic market for sewing machines and a late expansion of watches towards 
the world market. The withdrawal of sewing machines as shown in this table should however be 
qualifi ed by the fact that 1950 and 1955 were peak export years – for the entire period 1951–1955 
they accounted for 51.3% of overall production – on the one hand, and that they were primarily meant 
for foreign markets at the end of the 1940s rather than the domestic market, where the demand was 
not suffi ciently high yet, on the other hand.2 As for watches, they stood out on account of their late 
arrival on the world market compared to other precision machines, a phenomenon essentially due 
to the growing expansion of the domestic market and the difficulties encountered in perfecting a 
product that could compete with Swiss watches.3 Nevertheless, beyond these sectoral specifi cities, the 
precision machine industry as a whole presents a similar profi le, as it was an industry hardly geared 
to exports before the war which became a major player on the world market after 1945. At the peak 
of its commercial expansion before the war, in 1937, this industry exported less than 10 per cent of its 
production. It was not competitive with either Singer sewing machines or foreign-made cameras and 
watches, either mass-produced (United States) or high-quality goods (Germany, Switzerland).
In view of these conditions, the changeover of these sectors into an export industry was not a 
self-evident phenomenon. In the international literature, this change has not been tackled very 
much and has usually been presented as either the consequence of the State’s industrial policy at a 
macroeconomic level (protection of the domestic market, support of exports) or the result of factors 
coming under classical theory, such as the expansion of demand through access to the American 
market.4 This contribution focuses on the changes in the production system in the precision machine 
industry and is consistent with an approach close to the revisionist school, which highlights the key 
2 See Nihon mishin sangyoshi, Tokyo: Nihon mishin kyokai, 1961 and Hondai Susumu, “Keikikai kogyo no hatten to 
buhin no kikaku hyojunka – sekiyu hatsudoki to mishin no jirei”, Daito bunka daigaku kiyo, shakai-shizenkagaku, 23 
(1985), pp. 252–267.
3 Seiko no sengoshi, Tokyo: Seiko, 1996.
4 The most widely known example being Johnson Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial 
Policy, 1925–1975, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982. For the camera industry, see Nelson Patricia Ann, 
Rivalry and Cooperation: How the Japanese Photography Industry Went Global, University of Warwick, unpublished 
PhD thesis, 1998.
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role of the State while emphasizing elements of public intervention other than so-called industrial 
policy. Indeed, the State played a key role by training engineers at universities and its numerous R&D 
centers, enabling the precision machine industry to become competitive on the world market.
For this industry, the issue was not to recover after the war any markets lost due to the confl ict but 
rather to boost competitiveness by improving its production system, with a view to manufacturing 
products whose quality and cost made it possible to challenge fi rst movers. In the sewing machines 
sector, the mass production of a copy of a Singer machine – followed by the introduction of Swiss 
and German innovations – within a production system based on a pronounced vertical division of 
labor ensured the quick success of this industry against the American multinational.5 In the camera 
and watch industry, the situation of the world market was more complex, as it was relatively polarized 
between expensive high-quality products made in Germany and Switzerland and simple and cheap 
mass-produced goods turned out in the United States. The issue for Japanese manufacturers was to 
incorporate some elements from both of these production systems and to mass-produce high-quality 
goods, such as single-lens reflex cameras and self-winding watches, within what can be called a 
hybrid production system.6
This change was made possible by the intervention of production engineers, who restructured 
production within enterprises by introducing new technologies relying on standardized work (blueprints 
with tolerance norms, measuring instruments) and high-quality parts (precision machine tools). These 
engineers were already present in several industrial sectors before 1945, for example aeronautics 
and machine tools, where they restructured the production system.7 In the precision machine 
industry, however, they were largely absent, a fact that can explain the lack of competitiveness of 
this industry’s products in the second part of the 1930s. Their arrival in mass after the war was due 
to the development of the training of production engineers in the interwar years and World War II. 
Indeed, the growing needs of the arms industry led to the development of engineering faculties to 
meet the demands of Army and Navy armories and shipyards. Among these training centers, there 
was the Department for Arms Production (DAP) of the Faculty of Engineering of the University of 
Tokyo, which is the subject of this contribution.8 It played a key role in training engineers for the arms 
industry until 1945, and was redirected after the war towards the precision machine industry.
1.   From the Department for Arms Production (DAP) to the Department of Precision Engineering 
(DPE)
The Department for Arms Production (Zohei gakka, DAP) was one of the ten departments of 
5 Nihon mishin sangyoshi, op. cit., pp. 192–222.
6 Donzé, Pierre-Yves, “The hybrid production system and the birth of the Japanese specialized industry: Watch 
production at Hattori & Co. (1900–1960)”, Enterprise & Society, vol. 12 No.2, forthcoming in 2011.
7 Maeda, Hiroko, Senjiki kukoki kogyo to seisan gijutsu hensei – Mitsubishi kuko enjin to Fukao Junji, Tokyo: Tokyo 
University Press, 2001 and Yamashita, Mitsuru, Kosakukikai sangyo no shokubashi, 1889-1945 – Shokunin waza ni 
idonda gijutsushatachi, Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 2002.
8 Germany and Japan seem to be the only countries to have had university departments specialized in arms production. 
Tokyo daigaku hyakunenshi – bukyokushi, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1984, vol. 3, p. 238.
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the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tokyo.9 Opened in 1887 to train engineers for the 
armories of the Army and the Navy, in the interwar period it underwent a process of diversifi cation 
and specialization that led it to tackle mass production systems and the precision machine industry.
Until the beginning of the 1920s, the department was successively directed by Amano Tomitaro 
(1887–1903) and then by Okouchi Masatoshi (1903–1926), backed up by lecturers sent by the Army 
and the Navy. The main interests were artillery, ballistics and the production of explosives. The 
manufacture of mines and torpedoes led to the creation of a second chair specialized in this field, 
entrusted to lecturers (1901) and then to Professor Aoki Tamotsu (1911). The production of torpedoes, 
considered until World War II as one of the most complex precision machines, was then entrusted 
to a third chair specialized exclusively in this fi eld, occupied by Aoki (1920) and then by Nishimura 
Genrokuro (1943). At the same time, the second chair pursued its work on mines, extending it to cover 
new fi elds such as optical instruments, where teaching was provided by Assistant Professor Majima 
Masaichi (1920).10 In 1928, the second chair was reorganized and redirected towards the production of 
precision machines, with several specialized lecturers (optics, radars, mines, etc.) under the guidance 
of Professor Aoki. In addition, the production of weapons (cannons, tanks, special arms) was separated 
from the fi rst chair and became the fourth chair, headed by Majima (1921), Okoshi Makoto (1941) 
and then by Shibata Haruhiko (1944). Finally, a fi fth chair was created in 1944, for the production of 
precision arms, under the direction of Okoshi. Until the end of the war, the DAP thus played a key role 
in training engineers for the arms industry.
After 1945, the DAP was reorganized and redirected towards precision machines and was renamed 
the Department of Precision Engineering (Seimitsu kogakka, DPE). It consisted of only three 
chairs, occupied until the beginning of the 1960s by Aoki Tamotsu, Okoshi Makoto and Nishimura 
Genrokuro. Each year, the DPE welcomed 17 new students, mainly destined to enter precision 
machine fi rms. It maintained this structure until 1963, when it was restructured and enlarged to answer 
the new needs of this industry (automation, medical instruments, mechatronics, etc.).11
From the late 1920s to the early 1960s, the DAP / DPE presents a certain continuity as regards 
the level of the staff and the interest in precision machines. R&D activities and teaching on the 
introduction of a new production system in the arms industry were applied after the war to the 
precision machine industry. The careers of Professors Aoki and Okoshi were emblematic of this path.
2.  From torpedoes to watches: Aoki Tamotsu (1882–1966)
Born in 1882, Aoki trained at the DAP under the guidance of Okouchi Masatoshi and graduated in 
1908.12 He became Assistant Professor in this department in 1909 and was entrusted with lecturing on 
torpedoes and mines, a fi eld in which he specialized. After a two-year stint in the United States, France 
9 The others are aeronautics, applied chemistry, architecture, civil engineering, electricity, machines, metallurgy, mines 
and shipbuilding.
10 http://kotobank.jp (site accessed 19 June 2010). He especially carried out R&D in the fi eld of radars.
11 Tokyo daigaku hyakunenshi, op. cit., pp. 242–243.
12 20 seiki nihon jinmei jiten, Tokyo: Nichigai, 2004, vol. 1, p. 12 and Iseki, Kuro, Dainihon hakaseroku, Tokyo: Atene 
shobo, vol. 5, 1930, pp. 355–356.
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and Switzerland (1917–1919), he was appointed Professor for the third chair, devoted to his specialty 
(1920). He published four papers on this topic between 1915 and 1922 in the Journal of the Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (Kikai gakkai shi), obtaining a PhD in 1922 for his work on torpedoes. He was 
also interested in the workings of mechanical arms, such as guns.13 Finally, he published four books 
on weapons (1914, 1925, 1937, 1942).
At the same time, Aoki pursued some research in the field of the precision machine industry, 
particularly in watchmaking. Indeed, he applied his work to introducing mass production in arms 
manufacturing in the civilian industry, where he also encouraged the use of high-precision machine 
tools and the introduction of gauges and instruments for controlling the work.14 Accordingly, he 
supervised the redirection of the second chair of the DAP towards precision machines in 1928 and 
was among the founding members, as well as President until 1947, of the Society for Precision 
Engineering (Seimitsu kogakkai), an association bringing together since 1933 engineers involved in 
13 Aoki, Tamotsu, “Gekkei yakushin sokudo ni kansuru kenkyu”, Zohei iho, 4/1 (1926).
14 Aoki, Tamotsu, “Waga kuni no seimitsu kogyo kanken (keisoku kikai kigu, kogaku kikai)”, Kikai gakkai shi, 34/166 
(1931), pp. 152-187, and “Seimitsu kogaku to sangyo gorika”, Seimitsu kikai, 1/3 (1933), pp. 59–63.
Fig. 1: Organization of the DAP (Zohei gakka) of the University of Tokyo, 1887-1945
First Chair: ballistics, explosives, ordnance 
(1887) 
Fourth Chair: special arms; tanks 
(1921)
Fifth Chair (1944): 
Precision arms manufacturing 
Second Chair: arms manufacturing, mines; precision machines (1928) 
(1901) 
Third Chair: torpedos 
(1920) 
Source : Tokyo daigaku hyakunenshi – bukyokushi, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1984, vol. 3, pp. 235-252.
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R&D in the precision machine industry, born from the split with the Association of Explosive Arms 
(Kahei gakkai), which grouped together beginning in 1904 researchers of the arms industry.15 
Moreover, in 1935 Aoki did a fi ve-month inspection tour of Europe (Germany, Switzerland, France, 
United Kingdom) and the United States.16 In all, he visited 84 companies – of which more than half 
were in Germany – 6 R&D centers, 8 museums and exhibitions, 5 institutes and 1 technical college. 
This European tour is very important for the DAP’s turn towards precision machines, as it enabled 
Aoki to acquire some knowledge of key technologies for these sectors. He focused in particular on 
three of them. The fi rst one was machine tools, notably lathes, the main objective of this inspection 
tour. At the time, the Japanese machine tool industry was underdeveloped, and Japan relied heavily 
on imported machines in the fi rst half of the 1930s.17 Yet as Aoki himself pointed out, this special 
focus can be explained by the fact that “engineers must learn basic knowledge about machine tools. 
The less developed sector of our country is machine tools, and if we do not develop it, there will be 
a severe impact on precision engineering, of course, and moreover on national defense.”18 Thus, for 
Aoki, the development of a military power relied on the use of precise machine tools empowering it 
to mass produce weapons and armaments. He visited most of the machine tool makers of Germany, 
Switzerland, UK and the USA, paying close attention to the technical characteristics of machines 
(materials, speed, tools, gauges, micron). However, the development of such an industry, as in 
Germany or in Switzerland, relies not only on technical norms, but also on the training of technicians 
and engineers to use these technologies properly. That is why Aoki visited such places as a technical 
college in Zurich (Technische Hochschule), a German institute (Der Deutsche Frauenarbeitsdienst) 
and the electrical appliances multinational enterprise Siemens, which had an in-house program for 
the training of workers. The second technology Aoki was looking for in the West was measuring 
instruments. These were important for the adoption of mass production because they made it possible 
to measure the accuracy of the parts made by machine tools. They were thus a tool for the quality 
control of production. Aoki visited measuring instrument manufacturers in all the countries to which 
he travelled, with a special focus on the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (Paris), the 
National Bureau of Standards (Washington) and the Société Genevoise d’Instruments de Physique 
(SIP), at Geneva, which produced top-of-the-range instruments. Thirdly, Aoki was interested in 
optical industry. Here as well, the objective was to supply the Army and the Navy with precise optical 
instruments. Aoki visited 11 optical instrument manufacturers, among which the most known German 
producers (Carl Zeiss, Zeiss Ikon), and some R&D centers specialized in this industry (Institut 
d’Optique, Paris; Institut für Technische Optik, Berlin). He gave special attention to the production of 
lenses, the key part in the manufacturing of a high-precision product.
During the next ten years, between 1935 and 1945, Aoki worked on the equipment necessary for 
setting up mass production (measuring instruments, machine tools, standardized parts, new alloys). 
15 This association published the journal Seimitsu kikai since 1933.
16 Aoki, Tamotsu, “Obei shisatsudan”, Seimitsu kikai, 3/28 (1936), pp.1–17 and 3/36 (1939), pp. 352-365.
17 Tsushosangyosho (ed.), Shoko seisakushi, Tokyo: Tsushosangyosho (MITI), vol. 18, 1976 and Sawai, Minoru, “1930 
nendai no nihon kosakukikai kogyo”, Toshi seido shigaku, 97 (1982), pp. 32-50.
18 Aoki,Tamotsu, “Obei shisatsudan”, Seimitsu kikai, 3/28 (1936), p. 2.
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He published several reference books on such matters, two of which were reedited in 1948, and he 
supervised until 1945 the translation of some fifteen publications written by German engineers on 
machining methods and metalworking (see table 2). As a result of his commitment to the domestic 
machine tool industry, he was appointed President of the 20th Sub-Committee of the Japan Society 
for the Promotion of Scientifi c Research, dedicated to machine tools (1940).19 Three years later, he 
headed a R&D group for the production of pinion cutters, set up by the Army and bringing together 
some 40 members from universities – including his colleague Okoshi Makoto – , public and private 
R&D centers, and the main domestic machine makers (1943).20
Beside his academic work, Aoki was involved in the watchmaking industry, where he helped 
enhance the technological level. As parts were not yet fully interchangeable, the assembling of full 
watches relied on trained artisans, and Aoki supported the growth of this industry by developing 
training for this technical staff. He headed the Precision Industry High School (Koto seimitsu 
kogakko) when it was co-founded in 1933 by the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tokyo 
and the Horological Institute of Japan (Nihon tokei gakkai).21 The objective of this evening school, 
whose teachers all came from the Faculties of Engineering of Tokyo and Tohoku Universities – among 
whom Okoshi Makoto – was notably to participate to the training of watchmakers able to work on the 
assembling of watches. Finally, in 1938 Aoki published a book destined for watchmaking students.
After the war, Aoki was entrusted with one of the three chairs of the DPE and specialized in 
improving the technical level of watch industry. His discourse had not fundamentally changed but he 
began to focus on watchmakers. In one of the fi rst volumes of the journal Horology (Tokei), released 
in 1949, he promoted the adoption of some methods of the mass production system, taking the 
example of the British alarm clock factory, Smith English Clocks Ltd., which was producing goods 
with interchangeable parts half-automated assembled.22 In 1950, he also mentioned Ford and Singer 
as examples from which to draw inspiration.23 At the same time, however, he stressed the need to 
manufacture high-quality goods, that is, goods produced using precise machine tools, working with 
the micron as a reference unit.24 Here, the models were Swiss, particularly the company Tavannes 
Watch Co.: even if it did not realize mass production, strictly speaking, it had achieved a high degree 
of accuracy for its parts.25 In particular, Aoki recommended using Swiss-made Bechler automatic 
lathes.26 During his 1935 European tour, he indeed visited several of the most well-known machine 
tool suppliers of the Swiss watch enterprises (Aciera, Bechler, Mikron, Safag). In the 1950s, the 
Seiko engineer in charge of the development of machine tools, Tomine Ritsu, a DAP graduate, went 
thus to Switzerland and visited some of the companies his professor had entered some twenty years 
19 Aoki, Tamotsu,“Nihon gakujutsu shinkokai dai 29 shoiinkai (seimitsu kikai toku ni kosakukikai) ni okeru kenkyu”, 
Nihin kikai gakkai ronbunshu, 7/26-2,4 (1941), p. 1.
20 Aoki, Tamotsu, “Pinion – katta ni kansuru zadankai”, Seimitsu kikai, 10/121-123 (1943), pp. 615–634.
21 Yamaguchi, Ryuji, “Nihon tokei gakkai yuraiki II“, Kokusai tokei tsushin, 1979, p. 109.
22 Tokei, 2 (1949), pp. 35–39.
23 Tokei, 1950, pp. 7–10.
24 Tokei, 3 (1949), p. 99.
25 Tokei, 1950, pp. 7–10.
26 Tokei, 1950, pp. 7–10.
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Year Title Status Note
1914 The world of weapons Author
1925 Theory on the motion control during 
a shooting in water from the side 
weapons of a ship
Author
1935 Industry and workforce training Author
1935 Methods of capacity measure Author
1935 P re c i s e  m e a s u re  a n d  m e a s u re 
instruments
Author Reedited in 1948
1937 Reading-book on weapons Author
1938 Horology Author
1940 Study on the design of precision 
machines
Author Reedited in 1948
1941 Gearing device of machine-tools Co-translator H. Rognitz, Die Getriebe der Werkzeugmaschinen
1941 The use of electric heat in the steel and 
the non-steel metal industry
Co-translator O. Wundram
1941 Broaching machining Co-translator L. Knoll
1941 File Co-translator B. Buxbaum
1942 War and Precision Industry Author
1942 Electrical tools and compressed air 
tools
Co-translator H. Graf
1942 Screw cutting Co-translator O.M. Müller, Gewindeschneiden
1942 Tempering Steel Co-translator H. Herbers
1942 Milling cutter Co-translator P. Zieting & E. Brodner, Die Fräser,ihre 
Konstruktion und Herstellung
1943 Handbook on electrical melting for 
industry
Co-translator R. Hesse
1943 Processing and making of cast metal 
sand
Co-translator U .  L o h s e ,  F o r m s a n d a u f b e re i t u n g  u n d 
Gussputzerei
1943-
1944
Method of production of shoe trees Author
1944 Tools and other maintenance and 
examination instruments for the 
factory
Co-translator P. Heinze, Prüfen und Instandhalten von 
Werkzeugen und anderen Betriebshilfsmitteln
1944 Press machining Co-translator E. Krabbe
1944 Free forging Co-author Together with P. H. Schweissguss
1944 The economical use of single axe 
lathes
Co-translator H.  H.  F inkelnburg ,  Die  wir t schaf t l iche 
Verwendung von Einspindelautomaten
1947-
1948
Horology Author Reedited in 1949
1949 The industry of the new generation Co-translator A. P. Young
1950-
1951
Practical Benchwork for Horologists Co-translator L. & S. Levin
1954 Industrial measurement Author
1958 Theoretical horology Co-translator J. & H. Grossmann, Horlogerie théorique
Source: National Diet Library Catalog, Tokyo
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previously.27
Aoki also engaged in several associations after the war to help realize this aim. In 1946, he 
became President of a committee founded to supervise the adoption of standardization norms in the 
watchmaking industry, to which Okoshi also belonged, along with representatives of watchmaking 
companies.28 Morever, in 1948 he restructured the Horological Institute of Japan (Nihon tokei 
gakkai).29 While it was directed in the interwar period towards retailers and supported continuous 
training for the repair of watches, under the infl uence of Aoki, this institute became a scientifi c society 
similar to these existing in Switzerland and in Germany, that is, a body destined for production 
engineers of industrial firms and interested in the improvement of parts and mechanisms. Aoki 
also published several books on training watchmaking technicians, i.e. mid-level technical staff. In 
1947–1948, he brought out a new handbook in two volumes, Horology (Tokei). Finally, he translated 
two technical books during the 1950s, one written by the American Louis and Samuel Levin, 
producers of machine tools for watchmakers and jewelers, the first edition of which came out in 
1938 and was reedited many times in the United States, and one published by Jules Grossmann and 
his son Hermann, respectively professors at the watchmaking schools of Le Locle and Neuchâtel, in 
Switzerland.
In addition, Aoki was active as an independent consultant. He was engaged immediately after the 
war by the company Toyo Watch to give advice on technological matters.30 The content of his action is 
unknown but he probably helped oversee the restructuring of production in this manufacture of clocks 
and watches founded in 1920 and converted to war production in 1936. Restructured after the war, it 
became the third producer of watches in Japan under the name of Orient Watch.31 Aoki also sat on the 
Board of Tsugami Precision,32 a gauge and machine tool maker that employed fi ve graduates of the 
DAP / DPE in 1955 and that undertook to copy Bechler Swiss automatic lathes for the watchmaker 
Daini Seikosha in 1957.33
3.  Okoshi Makoto (1899-1969) and the improvement of machining methods
The second person who played a key role in the technological development of the Japanese 
precision machine industry is Professor Okoshi Makoto.34 Until the end of the war, he pursued a career 
as a researcher and teacher devoted to the improvement of metalworking and machining methods. 
He was close to Professor Okouchi, under whom he studied at the DAP. After he graduated in 1923, 
27 Donzé, Pierre-Yves “The Watchmaking Enterprises and the Growth of a Special-purpose Machine Tool Industry in 
Japan (1890-1960)”, Osaka Economic Papers, vol. 60 no. 1, June 2010, p. 31.
28 Nihon tokei kyokai 30 nen shi, Tokyo: Nihon tokei kyokai, 1980, p. 23.
29 Yamaguchi, Ryuji, “Nihon tokei gakkai yuraiki“, Kokusai tokei tsushin, 1979, pp. 42–48.
30 Kokusai tokei tsushin, 1979, p. 47.
31 Toyo seimitsu kogyo kabushikikaisha shi, Tokyo: Toyo seimitsu kogyo kabushikikaisha, 2005.
32 Kaiin shimeiroku, Tokyo: Gakushikai, 1955, p. 8.
33 Donzé, Pierre-Yves, “The Watchmaking Enterprises and the Growth of a Special-purpose Machine Tool Industry in 
Japan (1890-1960)”, Osaka Economic Paper, vol. 60/1 (2010), pp. 20–34.
34 20 seiki nihonjin, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 470, http://kotobank.jp (site accessed 27 April 2010), Kinoshita, Naonaru, “Okoshi 
Makoto sensei no omoide”, Seimitsu kikai 45/3 (1979), pp. 1–4 and Okoshi Makoto hakase kanreki teinen taikan kinen, 
Tokyo: Okoshi Makoto hakase kinen jigyokai, 1960.
OSAKA ECONOMIC PAPERS Vol.61 No.1??46?
Okoshi rejoined his master at the Institute for Physical and Chemical Research Center (Rikagaku 
kenkyujo).35 Founded in 1917 with a joint investment by the State and the private sector, this center 
aimed at carrying out applied research in physics and chemistry for private companies. In 1927, at 
the instigation of Okouchi Masatoshi, a private enterprise was founded under the name of Physical 
and Chemical Industry Company (Riken Industry Company since 1941), in order to industrialize 
and commercialize products developed by the R&D center.36 At this point, Okouchi left his position 
with the DAP in 1926 and continued his career as a director of the R&D center and a president of 
the production company, two positions he held until 1942 and 1946, respectively.37 Okoshi Makoto 
was thus called by his professor to work in one of the best R&D centers of the country in 1923 
(Rikagaku kenkyujo). They co-published two papers on new small drilling machines (1928).38 Okoshi 
then stayed at this center until the end of the war, working successively as a researcher (1932) then 
chief researcher (1945). At the same time, he began an academic career at the DAP, where he earned 
his PhD in 1931. He was engaged as a lecturer (1930), and then Assistant Professor (1931), to give 
lessons on machining soon after the second chair was redirected towards precision machines. In 1941, 
he was appointed Professor in charge of the fourth chair (special weapons and tanks), and then of the 
fi fth chair (mass production of arms) when it was created (1944).39
The work Okoshi did in the years 1930–1945 primarily focused on ways to improve the precision 
of various machines (gauging machines, cutting machines, milling machines). Between 1934 and 
1945, he published 39 papers on these questions, mainly in the reviews Seimitsukikai, Kikai gakkaishi 
and the Bulletin for the Manufacture of Arms (Zohei iho). In addition, he attended a meeting chaired 
by Aoki on improving pinion cutters (1943). The objective of Okoshi’s work was to improve the 
quality of the equipment of weapons factories, through a better understanding of machining processes 
and increased precision for machine tools. Very early on, however, he showed a keen interest in the 
possible application of his work to the civilian sector, notably in the precision machine industry. In an 
article published in 1934, he highlighted, using the examples of the fi rms Nihon Kogaku Kogyo (Nikon) 
and Takachiho Works (Olympus), how the use of precision machine tools and measuring instruments 
made it possible to manufacture high-quality goods.40 What is more, in a long article that came out 
in 1932 in the journal Seimitsu kikai, he explained the need for the Japanese precision machine 
industry to start conducting fundamental research designed to improve product quality, with the aim 
of becoming competitive on the world market. The example of the mass production of weapons and 
of munitions highlighted the necessity of adopting new tools (gauges, tolerance norms, measuring 
35 Udagawa, Masarau (ed.), Nihon no kigyokashi, Tokyo: Bunshindo, 2002, p. 205.
36 Saito, Satoshi, Shinko kontserun riken no kenkyu: Okouchi Masatoshi to riken sangyodan, Tokyo: Jichosha, 1987. This 
center carried out research on atomic bombs during World War II.
37 Udagawa, Masarau (ed.), Nihon no kigyokashi, Tokyo: Bunshindo, 2002, p. 205.
38 Okouchi, Masatoshi and Okoshi, Makoto, “Kiri no sessakuryoku ni tsuite oyobi kogu kenmaki no shinkoan”, Kikai 
gakkai shi, 31/136 (1928), 331–333, and “Ido kaju ni yoru renzokuryo no tawami oyobi shichu ni oyobosu chikara”, 
Kikai gakkai shi, 31/136 (1928), pp. 620–624.
39 Tokyo daigaku hyakunenshi, op. cit., pp. 237–238.
40 Okoshi, Makoto, “Seimitsu kikai kigu”, Kikai gakkai shi, 37 (1937), pp. 20–28.
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instruments, etc.), high-precision machine tools and adequate materials.41
In 1945, Okoshi was entrusted with one of the three chairs of the DAP when it was restructured 
as the Department of Precision Engineering (DPE), becoming at the same time Professor at the 
Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tohoku. When he retired from both these chairs, in 1960, 
he was appointed Professor at Toyo University, a private Tokyo-based institution. By the 1950s, 
he had become one of the most renowned professors in the fi eld of precision machines. He served 
successively as President of the Seimitsu Kikai Gakkai (1950-1951) and of the Nihon Kikai Gakkai 
(1954-1955), and was awarded the Japan Academy Prize in 1952. 
Okoshi’s R&D activities were still about machining and the improvement of machine tools. He 
published tens of articles on this subject in the main scientifi c journals of the country (Seimitsukikai, 
Kikai gakkaishi), also directed his interest towards new horizons, such as the production of syringes 
(1950)42 or of roller chains (1953).43 Above all, he continued after the war his efforts in the 1930s to 
stress the need to transform the production mode in the precision machine industry (watches, clocks, 
sewing machines, optical apparatuses) to enable it to compete on the world market.44 
Moreover, in 1957, he directed a research group that travelled to the United States to study the 
collaboration between industry and universities in the training of engineers and common R&D (see 
table 3).45 For seven weeks, they visited most of the American engineering faculties, R&D centers 
and private companies, where they observed concrete cases of collaboration between the private and 
public sectors (commissioned research, evening courses for engineers, tax exemption for private gifts 
to engineering faculties, etc.). Special attention was paid to the training of scientists and engineers 
in universities, which occurred with the active support of private fi rms for the ongoing training of 
their engineers. Okoshi gives the example of the so-called Honors Cooperative Program at Stanford 
University, whereby 27 private fi rms sent their own engineers to the university three days a week for 
fi ve years and provided fi nancial support for this program. This made it possible for the fi rms to keep 
their own engineers trained at the highest level and to benefi t from the latest technologies developed 
at universities.46 As for R&D commissioned by private fi rms from universities, it took place within 
an organized framework, as the universities had set up special structures – such as the Industrial 
Associate Plan at California Institute of Technology or the Industrial Liaison Program at M.I.T. – to 
supervise its development. In 1957, when Okoshi visited these universities, the percentage of private 
funding for all R&D expenditures was quite high (31% at California Institute of Technology, 24% at 
Illinois University, 17% at M.I.T.).47 Moreover, the group directed by Okoshi also visited some special 
independent centers for customer-based R&D attached to universities (Mellon Institute, Stanford 
41 Okoshi, Makoto, “Seimitsu kikai kogyokai ni okeru kisoteki kenkyu kadai”, Seimitsu kikai, 5/60 (1938), pp. 505–507.
42 Okoshi, Makoto and Fukui, Shinji, “Chushabari ni kansuru kenkyu”, Ikakikaigaku zasshi, 5 (1950), pp. 4–9.
43 Okoshi, Makoto and Nakayama, Kazuo, “Rora chein no taimamosei ni tsuite”, Seimitsukikai, 19/222 (1953), pp. 324–
328 and 19/224 (1953), pp. 396–399.
44 Okoshi, Makoto, “Boekijo yori mita waga kuni seimitsukikai kogyo no genjo”, Seimitsukikai, 14/166–167 (1948), pp. 
87–89.
45 Okoshi Makoto, “Beikoku ni okeru kogyo kyoiku no jitsujo”, Seimitsu kikai, 24/5 (1958), p. 233–238.
46 Okoshi, Makoto, “Beikoku ni okeru kogyo kyoiku no jitsujo”, Seimitsu kikai, 24/5 (1958), p. 235.
47 Okoshi, Makoto, “Beikoku ni okeru kogyo kyoiku no jitsujo”, Seimitsu kikai, 24/5 (1958), p. 236.
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Research Institute). As for the private fi rms which were visited, Okoshi did not give any details in 
his report but most of them were leading multinational enterprises in aeronautics (Hughes Aircraft), 
automobile (Ford), electrical appliances (Western Electric, Westinghouse Electric) and machine tool 
(Cincinnati Milling Machine) industries, which all had in-house training facilities and outsourced 
some R&D and technical staff training to universities.
?????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
Type Nom Localité
University Stanford University San Francisco
University California Institute of Technology Pasadena
University University of California Los Angeles
University Northwestern University Chicago
University Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago
University University of Illinois Illinois
University University of Cincinnati Cincinnati
University Carnegie Institute of Technology Pittsburgh
University Columbia University New York
University Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn New York
University Yale University New Haven
University Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) Boston
University Northeastern University Boston
University George Washington University Washington
Research Center Stanford Research Institute San Francisco
Research Center Research Laboratory of Quaker Oats Co. Chicago
Research Center Institute of Gas Technology Chicago
Research Center Armour Research Formation of Illinois Institute of Technology Chicago
Research Center Mellon Institute Pittsburgh
Research Center Bureau of Standards Washington
Private Firm Hughes Aircraft Co. Los Angeles
Private Firm Western Electric Co. Chicago
Private Firm Dandley Machine Tool Co. Chicago
Private Firm Cincinnati Milling Machine Co. Cincinnati
Private Firm Westinghouse Electric Co. Pittsburgh
Private Firm Ford Co. Detroit
Private Firm Ex-Cell-O Co. Detroit
Private Firm Harada Inc. Kalamazoo
Other Museum of Science and Industry Chicago
Other American Society for Engineering Education Illinois
Other Engineers Society of Cincinnati Cincinnati
Source : Okoshi Makoto, “Beikoku ni okeru kogyo kyoiku no jitsujo”, Seimitsu kikai, 24/5 (1958), p. 233.
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Heading the Machine Experiment Station
Okoshi thus had a keen interest in the development and strengthening of cooperative R&D between 
universities and private companies. When he traveled to the United States, he was already very 
mindful of this necessary collaboration. Indeed, soon after the war, he engaged in such a policy 
when he headed the Machine Experiment Station (Kikai shikenjo) of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry (1946–1950).
The Machine Experiment Station was founded in 1937 by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
(MCI; Ministry of International Trade and Industry, MITI, since 1949) with the aim of supporting 
the technological development of the machine industry, particularly automobile and machine tools.48 
It also promoted the development of the weapon industry during the war and was redirected towards 
civilian industry after 1945. When it was reorganized in 1946, the MCI entrusted its direction to 
Okoshi Makoto, with the objective of supporting the precision machine industry in its reconversion 
towards exports. Shortly after joining the MCI, he set out his view in an article entitled “The 
reconstruction of Japan and the mission of the Machine Experiment Station”.49 As a result of the 
dissolution of the zaibatsu and the cessation of military R&D, only the State was left to spearhead the 
research activities needed to improve the technological level of the precision machine industry. This 
function was granted to the Machine Experiment Station when Okoshi arrived at its head.
Beside its work on automobile and machine tools, which were still major concerns, Okoshi also 
organized research on watches, optical apparatuses and sewing machines. In 1946, the Station had 
four divisions (machines; measuring instruments and precision machines; materials; automobiles) 
and employed 354 persons.50 Its main activity consisted of testing the quality and operation of 
various machines produced by private firms. The Station engineers disassembled them, analyzed 
their functioning and evaluated their quality in comparison with the foreign products that dominated 
the world market (Swiss watches, Singer sewing machines, German cameras).51 Some research work 
aimed at improving precision and part durability. Moreover, in order to promote competition between 
domestic fi rms and improve their product quality, the Station organized quality contests for sewing 
machines (1947–1949), watches and alarm clocks (1948–1953) and cameras (1948–1954). Likewise, 
Station researchers carried out R&D to improve these objects. Between 1946 and 1960, the Station 
registered 61 patents,52 including one under the name of Okoshi Makoto for a cutting tool for stones.53 
Several of these patents were subsequently used by private fi rms, notably Olympus Optical Industry.54 
Finally, the Station supervised the launching of common R&D with private fi rms and universities, 
mainly in the camera and watch industry, with the aim of improving the quality of parts and also 
their mass production. The example of watchmaking, an industry with which Okoshi worked closely, 
48 Kikai shikenjo 25 nen shi, Tokyo: Kikai shikenjo, 1963. 
49 Okoshi, Makoto, “Nihon saiken to kikai shikenjo no shimei”, Kikai shikenjo shoho, 2/2 (1947), pp. 2–4.
50 Kikai shikenjo 25 nen shi, Tokyo: Kikai shikenjo, 1963, p. 12.
51 Kikai shikenjo 25 nen shi, Tokyo: Kikai shikenjo, 1963, pp. 64–73.
52 Kikai shikenjo 25 nen shi, Tokyo: Kikai shikenjo, 1963, pp. 41–43.
53 Kikai shikenjo 25 nen shi, Tokyo: Kikai shikenjo, 1963, p. 41. Patent No. 182,324.
54 Kikai shikenjo 25 nen shi, Tokyo: Kikai shikenjo, 1963, p. 45.
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illustrates the various issues of this strategy.
The common R&D activities in the watchmaking industry
In the watchmaking industry, Okoshi organized workshops between researchers from universities 
and private companies.55 This R&D group lasted from 1946 to 1949. Bringing together 49 members, 
it was chaired by Okoshi and had other personalities from the DAP, such as Aoki, several government 
offi cials from the Machine Experiment Station and the MITI, and representatives from the watch and 
machine industries. Its main objective was to gather and share various capabilities and information. 
It is worth mentioning the presence of delegates from machine tool fi rms (Sonoike, Maruwa Seiki, 
Tsugami, Mitsubishi Heavy Industry), a factor which refl ected the importance attached to production 
technologies. Okoshi was also president of one of the six sections of this R&D group, the one focusing 
on manufacturing processes (other sections dealt with mechanism effi ciency, gears, wheels, materials, 
and liaisons).56 This group presented a total of 177 papers. This scientifi c activity was then pursued 
from 1950 onwards by the Horological Institute of Japan, presided by Aoki.57
4.  The careers of the engineers trained by Aoki and Okoshi
The directories of the alumni association Gakushikai, which brought together the graduates of the 
old imperial universities, make it possible to determine the employment of the engineers of the DAP 
then the DPE at different points in their career.58 The comparison between the positions occupied in 
1942 and in 1955 highlights both the specialization of these engineers in armament and munitions 
during the war and the redirection of careers towards the civilian industry, particularly in the precision 
machines sector after 1945.59
This source includes 242 graduates from the DAP in 1942, out of whom the place of employment 
is known for 235. These engineers were largely directed to work in the fi eld for which they had been 
trained: weapons production.60 Two major places of employment can be highlighted. The fi rst one 
is the Army and the Navy, which employed about one-third of all DAP graduates (33.5% in 1942). 
Table 5 gives an overview of the sections of the Navy and the Army where these engineers were 
active. Most of them were employed in the Navy (51), where they especially carried out R&D on sea 
mines and torpedoes: 10 were engaged in this specifi c fi eld, of whom 5 were at the second section 
of the Headquarters for Naval Vessels, 3 at Kure Shipyard and 2 at Yokosuka Shipyard. At the time, 
torpedoes were considered as the most complex precision machine, and the experience gained in this 
sector during the war was used by several precision machine makers after 1945. This was for example 
55 Nihon tokei kyokai 30 nen shi, Tokyo: Nihon tokei kyokai, 1980, pp. 16–18.
56 Nihon gakujutsu shinkokai dai 95 iinkai hen, Tokei seisan gijutsu no kenkyu, Tokyo: Nihon gakujutsu shinkokai, 1951, 
p. 3.
57 Nihon tokei kyokai 30 nen shi, Tokyo: Nihon tokei kyokai, 1980, p. 17.
58 Even if all the graduates did not join this association, a large number of them were members, and this source gives an 
excellent overview of the employment of the imperial university graduates and their career paths.
59 Kaiin shimei roku, Tokyo: Gakushikai, 1942 and 1955.
60 On the R&D activities of the Navy in the interwar period, see Sawai, Minoru, “Senkanki ni okeru kaigun 
gijutsukenkyujo no katsudo”, Osaka Economic Papers, Vol. 58 No. 1 (2008), pp. 1-16. 
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the case with Suzukawa Hiroshi, who entered the second section of the Headquarters for Naval 
Vessels after graduated from the DAP (1940) and was hired by Canon after the war, where he became 
head of the industrial design division in 1955. The second point was that both the Army and the Navy 
employed several DAP graduates in their aeronautics R&D centers. These high-tech research centers 
were also important steps in the career of the engineers who took over the technological development 
of several private companies after the war. In the precision industry sector, this was in particular 
the case with Nakajima Fujitaro, employed by Takano Precision Industry in 1955, with Fukuoka 
Shigetada, who joined Nikon after the war and went on to become its President, and with Kensuke 
Shoji, Managing Director in 1955 of Kinka Machine Co., a producer of parts for sewing machines. 
Thus, most of the DAP graduates engaged by the Army and the Navy worked as engineers for the 
production of weapons and R&D in related fi elds. After the war, nearly all of them found employment 
in the industry. In 1955, while the fate of 18.6% is unknown – dead or no longer members of the 
Gakushikai – and the occupation of 10.5% is not mentioned, 65.1% were working in the industry. 
There was thus a huge shift from the military to the civilian industry. Yet, apart from Japan Steel 
Works, which took on seven DAP graduates after the war, no company employed more than two of 
these engineers. They scattered towards many companies, notably in the precision machine and the 
machine tool industries, as shown by the few examples given above.
?????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1942 1955
Fonction Number % Number %
Army, Navy 81 33.5 2 0.8
University, schools 13 5.4 15 6.2
Administration 10 4.1 11 4.5
Research Centers 5 2.1 1 0.4
Industry: electrical appliances 13 5.4 12 5.0 
Industry: machine-tools 17 7.0 21 8.7 
Industry: metallurgy 18 7.4 18 7.4 
Industry: precision machine 22 9.1 33 13.6 
Industry: various 53 21.9 60 24.8 
Independent / other 1 0.4 4 1.7
Not mentioned 9 3.7 22 9.1
Absent - - 43 17.8
Total 242 100 242 100
Source: Kaiin shimeiroku, Tokyo: Gakushikai, 1942 and 1955.
Note: in 1955, the engineers covered by the category ‟Army, Navy” were members of the Self-Defense Force (jieitai).
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Place of employment N
Navy 51
Headquarters for Naval Vessels 13
Imperial Navy Technical Research Institute 3
Aeronautical Research Institute 7
Yokosuka Naval Shipyard 6
Kure Naval Shipyard 5
Hikari Naval Shipyard 2
Sasebo Naval Shipyard 2
Maizuru Naval Shipyard 1
Not mentioned (offi cer, soldier) 12
Army 30
Army Technical Headquarters 8
Science Research Center of the Army 3
Aeronautical Research Institute 4
Tokyo Arsenal 2
Tokyo Second Arsenal 2
Kokura Arsenal 1
Incheon Arsenal 1
Osaka Arsenal 1
Army Fuel Arsenal 1
Not mentioned (offi cers) 7
Source: see tab. 4.
Despite the important weight of the Army and the Navy, they were definitively not the only 
employers of the DAP graduates in 1942. Indeed, as can be seen from table 4, 123 of them,  that is 
more than half of the all the graduates (50.3%), worked in private companies. This means that some 
DAP-trained engineers entered private companies without having worked for the Army or the Navy. 
Moreover, only a very small number of them were engaged by private firms specialized in arms 
production: four engineers at Chuo Industry, one at Dainippon Arms and one at Hitachi Arms Works. 
Actually, as the entire industry was engaged in war production at the time, the distinction between 
military and civilian industry in 1942 is not absolute. Some DAP graduates working in machine, 
metalworking or electrical appliance companies may have been employed to supervise and organize 
war production within these companies. For example, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the biggest private 
employer of DAP graduates in 1942 (see tab. 6), obviously hired these engineers for the production of 
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war material: one served at Nagasaki Munitions Works and seven at Tokyo Machine Works, a plant 
specialized in tank production.61 The other engineers were dispersed between the Nagoya Aircraft 
Works (2), the shipyards of Nagasaki (1), Kobe (1) and Yokohama (1), and the headquarters (1). The 
case of Japan Steel Works is very similar. This steelmaking company involved in weapons production 
was founded in 1907 as a joint venture company between Hokkaido Colliery & Steamship Co. and 
two British arms manufacturers, Vickers Sons and Armstrong, Whitworth & Co.62 The actual work 
carried out by the fi ve DAP engineers is unknown, but they may have been engaged in the production 
of weapons. Three of them are not mentioned any longer in the 1955 Gakushikai directory, perhaps 
due to their death in the 1945 bombing of the main plant which killed some 200 employees. Also, 
Japan Optical Industry (Nikon since 1988), the second biggest private employer of DAP graduates in 
1942, was a fi rm founded in 1917 to carry out R&D and produce optical instruments for the Navy.63 
As for the Army, it sourced these apparatuses from the company Tokyo Optical Industry (Topcon), 
founded in 1932 by the watchmaker Hattori.64 It employed three DAP-trained engineers in 1942. 
Finally, one should mention the presence of Tokyo Aircraft Instruments within these main employers. 
This fi rm began by producing measuring instruments for the aircrafts and then participated directly in 
the war effort. Nothing is known about the actual work carried out by the DAP graduates within the 
other main fi rms mentioned in table 6.
?????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Name Industry Number of DAP graduates
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Machine 14
Japan Optical Industry (Nikon) Optical instrument 9
Japan Steel Works Steel 5
Toyo Precision Testing instrument 5
Japan Special Steel Steel 4
Tokyo Aircraft Instruments Measuring instrument 4
Chuo Industry Weapon 4
Sumitomo Metal Industries Metal 4
Riken Industry General 3
Kawasaki Heavy Industry Machine 3
Hitachi Works Electrical appliance 3
Tokyo Optical Industry (Topcon) Optical instruments 3
Toshiba Electrical appliance 3
Source: see tab. 4.
61 Mitsubishi jukogyo kabushiki kaisha shi, Tokyo: Mitsubishi jukogyo, 1956, pp. 299-304.
62 Nihon seikojo hyakunenshi, Tokyo: Nihon seikojo, 2008.
63 40 nenshi, Tokyo: Nihon kogaku kogyo kabushikikaisha, 1960.
64 Tokyo kogaku 50 nenshi, Tokyo: Topcon, 1982.
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Apart from these firms which engaged more than two DAP graduates in 1942, there was also a 
huge number of companies which employed one or two of them. Among the 123 engineers working 
in private fi rms in 1942, nearly half of them (63) were in such a case. Here, a special mention should 
be made of the precision machine industry (9.1%) and the machine tool industry (7.0%). In both 
sectors, DAP was carrying out R&D to support their technological development since the end of the 
1920s. There was thus a link with the industry prior to the war. Among the 17 engineers engaged in 
the precision industry, the majority worked on manufacturing optical instruments for the Army and the 
Navy. Nine were employed at Nippon Optical Industry (Nikon). Finally, the last fi ve engineers active 
at the time in the precision machine industry were working at the watch and clock companies Seikosha 
(2) and Tokyo Clock (1), as well as at the scientific and measuring instruments manufacturers 
Shimadzu (1) and Tanaka Instruments (1). All these fi rms produced weapons and munitions during the 
war, and these engineers were probably in charge of this production.
Finally, in 1942, there were also 28 DAP graduates working outside the military and the industry. 
Thirteen worked at universities and schools, especially at the University of Tokyo (fi ve, including four 
at DAP) and Tokyo Institute of Technology (two), while the others primarily served at engineering 
faculties (one at Osaka University; one at Keijo University, Seoul) or at industry high schools (one at 
Yamanashi Industry High School and one at Ube Industry High School). Accordingly, their role was 
to train the new generation of engineers, to support the war effort, and subsequently the technological 
development of the industry after 1945.65 Eight of them were indeed still engaged at universities in 
1955. The administration was a source of employment for 10 DAP graduates in 1942, in particular fi ve 
in some agencies of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Patent Offi ce and Machine Experiment 
Station) and one in the Scientifi c Division of the Cabinet Planning Agency (Kikakuin). Finally, six 
DAP graduates were engaged by research centers, namely at the Aircraft Research Center, the Riken 
Research Center and the Railway Research Center.
After 1945, there was no major shift except for the engineers employed by the Army and the Navy 
during the war. In 1955, 198 of the 242 engineers listed in 1942 were still present and 176 were 
professionally active. The persons employed in the industry and the administration in 1942 did not 
redirect their career, with the exception of a few cases of change from the industry towards academic 
positions or in the administration, as well as from the administration to the industry. It is however 
diffi cult to ascertain how many engineers remained within the same company or group, due to the 
dissolution of the zaibatsu and the restructuring of many industrial groups after the war. Yet the 
demilitarization of Japan impacted on the employment of the 86 engineers who were working for 
the Army and the Navy in 1942. Thirteen years later, the fate of 70 of them is known. 61 were still 
active, most of them in industrial firms (53), careers in universities (2), the administration (1) the 
Army (1), or, exceptionally, as independents (3). One out of fi ve engineers who redirected his career 
towards industry was engaged in the precision machine sector (watches, sewing machines, measuring 
instruments, cameras), as illustrated by the examples mentioned above. Together with the machine 
65 Sawai, Minoru, “Senchu – sengo Osaka no shinsetsu koto kogyo gakko – kogyo senmon gakko”, Osaka Economic 
Papers, vol. 57 no. 4, March 2008, pp. 278-296.
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tool industry, which employed 21 of the pre-1942 DAP graduates in 1955 against only 17 in 1955, the 
precision machine industry (33 pre-1942 DAP graduates in 1955 against 22 in 1942) was the sector 
which benefi ted most from the post-war shift, while metalworking and electrical appliance industries 
were not especially prone to engaging former DAP graduates after 1945.
????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1955
Function Number %
Army, Navy - -
University, school 5 11.6 
Administration 4 9.3
Research centers - -
Industry: various 11 35.8 
Industry: metalworking 2 4.7 
Industry: electrical appliances 6 14.0 
Industry: machine-tools 6 14.0 
Industry: precision machine 5 11.6
Independent / other - -
Total 43 100
Source: see table 4.
One should also ask what are the characteristics of the employment of the engineers who graduated 
the Department of Precision Engineering (DPE), as DAP was renamed in 1945. An analysis of its 
structure and organization reveals a continuity of the teaching staff and a reorientation towards the 
needs of the civil industry, especially in the precision machine industry. As shown in table 7, an 
overwhelming majority of postwar DEP graduates who were members of the Gakushikai (1946-
1955) entered private firms (79.1%), most of them in machine tool (14.0%), in precision machine 
(11.6%) and in electrical appliance (14.0%) companies.66 As was the case in 1942, DPE graduates 
did not mainly flow towards a few big enterprises but rather were engaged by a wide number of 
fi rms. In the machine tool industry, Tsugami Precision employed two new graduates, while Ikegai, 
Okamoto, Shibaura Industry and Mitsui Precision each engaged only one new graduate. The situation 
was similar in the precision machine industry, where six companies each hired one DPE graduate: 
the camera makers Nihon Optical Industry (Nikon) and Canon; the watch maker Daini Seikosha; 
the scientific instruments and machine producer Shimadzu Works; and the producer of measuring 
instruments Tokyo Aircraft Instruments. The relative small number of engineers hired by enterprises 
66 In 1946-1955, these 43 members represented about 25% of all the DEP graduates for this period.
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in these both sectors can be explained by the fact that they had already employed some of them during 
the war and usually did not sack them after 1945. If one considers the cumulated number of DAP / 
DPE graduates active in 1955, that is, the engineers who stayed since the war and these engaged after 
1945, the machine tool and the precision machine industries are preponderant. Among the 15 biggest 
employers in 1955, there were 3 camera makers (Nikon, Canon, Topcon), 2 instrument/tool makers 
(Tokyo Aircraft Instruments, Nippei Machine) and 1 machine tool maker (Tsugami Works).
Nevertheless, these two sectors were not the only job opportunity for DAP / DPE graduates after 
the war. Indeed, they were trained in not only producing precision machinery, but also in introducing 
it within the production system in general. This is probably what explains the large number of these 
engineers who entered electrical appliance companies after the war. While this sector employed 
only 5.4% of the graduates in 1942, this proportion rose to 14.0% for the period 1946-1955. Some 
companies such as Toshiba, Oki Electric and Hitachi were organizing the mass production system 
during these years.67 They obviously needed the DAP / DPE graduates for its implementation. 
As for the other sectors of the industry, they appear to be a major employer of DPE graduates after 
the war, as nearly one-third of these graduates took employment in private fi rms active in other sectors 
than machine tools, precision instruments and electrical appliance makers. Yet, as in 1942, there 
were no sectors or companies which were predominantly hiring these engineers, the only exception 
being the steel and general machine industries. Indeed, among the biggest employers of DAP / DPE 
graduates in 1955 were two steelmaking companies (Japan Steel Works; Japan Special Steel) and 
Mitsubishi Japan Heavy Industry. Nevertheless, the presence of these companies within the 1955 
ranking for main employers is due to from different employment strategies. In the case of Japan Steel 
Works, virtually all of the 11 engineers were hired after the war. The only person already in charge 
in 1942 who was still working in 1955 was Shintani Tetsuji. After graduating from DAP in 1924, he 
entered Japan Steel and was an engineer at the Hiroshima plant during WWII. He became a member of 
the Board of Directors in 1946 and Chairman the following year.68 As for the other engineers, they had 
worked during the war for various Army or Navy arsenals (7), for the arms manufacturing company 
Hitachi Weapon Co. (1) and for Riken Machine Tool Co. (1). Only one postwar graduate was hired, 
in 1946. Some other companies, such as Oki Electric, employed only postwar DPE graduates. Thus, 
the war experience was not a necessity for all companies. In other fi rms, however, the large number of 
DAP / DPE graduates in 1955 is mainly due to their pre-1945 employment. Among the six engineers 
of Mitsubishi Japan Heavy Industries, as was renamed in 1952 one of the three companies resulting 
from the dissolution of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, four were former engineers of Tokyo Machine 
Works, while two others graduated from Tokyo University, in 1944 and 1951, respectively.
67 Wakabayashi, Naoki, Kaden sangyo seicho no kiseki, Tokyo: Denpa shuppan, 1992.
68 Nihon tekkojo hyakunenshi, Tokyo: Nihon Tekkojo, 2008, pp. 720 and 723.
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Name Industry Number of DAP graduates
Japan Optical Industry (Nikon) Optical instruments 12
Japan Steel Works Steel 11
Mitsubishi Japan Heavy Industries General machines 6
Canon Camera Optical instruments 5
Oki Electric Electrical appliances 5
Sumitomo Metal Industries Metalworking 5
Tokyo Aircraft Instruments Measuring instruments 5
Tsugami Works Machine tools 5
Hitachi Works Electrical appliances 3
Ishikawajima Heavy Industry Jet engines 3
Japan Special Steel Steel 3
Nippei kiki Tools 3
Nisshin Machine Industry Machines 3
Tokyo Optical Industry (Topcon) Optical instruments 3
Toshiba Electrical appliances 3
Source: Kaiin shimeiroku, Tokyo: Gakushikai, 1955.
In addition, some graduates entered universities and other schools. In 1955, a total of 38 DAP / DPE 
graduates worked in such institutions, of whom only 5 had graduated after 1945. Education did not 
become an obviously important job opportunity after the war. Unsurprisingly, the biggest employer 
in education was the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tokyo (11), followed by Chuo 
University (5), a private university specialized in law and business which opened in 1944 a faculty of 
engineering with two departments of mechanics and aeronautics,69 the Tokyo Institute of Technology 
(2) and Yokohama National University (2). The last 18 professors taught in other various universities 
and high schools, usually in the faculties of engineering.
Finally, the administration was still a place of employment after the war. Some 24 DAP / DPE 
engineers were there in 1955, of whom 3 had graduated after the war. Nearly half of them worked in 
some agencies and departments of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (10): six at the 
Machine Experiment Station – two of whom conducting research for the watch industry70 - directed by 
DPE professor Okoshi since 1946, two in the aeronautic industry division, one in the patent offi ce and 
one in the central offi ce. Accordingly, they were working to support the technological development 
their fellow graduates were undertaking in private firms. Most of the other DAP / DPE engineers 
69 Chuo daigaku hyakunenshi, Tokyo: Chuo University, 2 vol., 2001-2003.
70 Nihon tokei kyokai 30 nenshi, Tokyo: Nihon tokei kyokai, 1980, pp. 16–17.
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working as civil servants were in charge in some prefectural institutions engaged in R&D activities to 
back the development of local enterprises (Aichi, Hyogo, Kanagawa, Osaka).
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to highlight the contribution of universities, and mainly of 
engineering faculties, to the development of the Japanese precision machine industry between 1930 
and 1960. The Department for Arms Production (DAP) of the University of Tokyo, which after the 
war became the Department of Precision Engineering (DPE), was tackled as an example, with a 
special focus on the activities of two professors, Aoki Tamotsu and Okoshi Makoto, and on the career 
of the engineers who graduated from this department. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize two 
points.
Firstly, this case study contributes to an understanding of the process of redirecting the war 
industry towards civilian industry after 1945 (gunmin tenkan). The contribution of the war to civilian 
industry is not a new topic.71 In the case of Japan, it gave rise to a wide literature highlighting the 
role of engineers in this process.72 However, their actions in terms of product innovation have been 
largely emphasized in these works, showing the use of knowledge acquired while producing arms to 
developing new industries (automobile, bullet train, ball bearing, radio, etc.). Yet the example of the 
DAP engineers reveal that their action was also decisive for process innovation. The introduction of 
new technologies enabling the introduction of mass production, as they were studied at the DAP and 
tested in the naval shipyards and armories during the war, appears as a key element in the shift of 
precision machine enterprises towards competitive fi rms in the 1950s.
Secondly, the role of the State and of industrial policy must be recalled here. In the international 
literature, special emphasis is placed on both the support of exports and the protection of the domestic 
market as elements explaining the growth of a competitive industry in Japan. Yet, in some industries, 
the State also intervened at another level ever since the interwar period, one certainly less visible from 
abroad as it did not lead to international commercial frictions, that is, the organization of collective 
R&D in collaboration with universities and industry (sankangaku renkei).73 Firms wishing to boost 
their technological level have a choice between in-house R&D and collaboration with external 
partners, such as foreign companies, through licensing agreement or joint ventures. Collaboration 
71 See for example Roland, Alex, “Technology and War: A Bibliographical Essay”, in Smith, Merritt Roe (ed.), Military 
Enterprise and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985, 
pp. 347-379 and Ndiaye, Pap, Nylon and Bombs: DuPont and the March of Modern America, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2006. 
72 Takashi, Nishiyama, Swords into plowshares: civilian application of wartime military technology in modern Japan, 
1945–1964, The Ohio State University, dissertation, 2005, Sawai, Minoru, “Sengo fukkoki nihon no kenkyu kaihatsu 
taisei: gunmin tenkan to kenkyu kaihatsu no saikochiku”, in Nakamura, Tetsu (ed.), 1930 nendai no higashi ajia 
keizai, Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha, 2006, pp. 135–163, Sawai, Minoru, “Gijutsusha no gunmin tankan to tetsudo gijutsu 
kenkyujo”, Osaka Economic Papers, Vol. 59 No. 1 (2009), pp. 1-18, Ueda Hirofumi, “Sengo fukkoki no bearing 
sangyo”, in Hara, Akira (ed.), Fukkoki no nihon keizai, Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2002, pp. 225–252.
73 For the period 1960–1980, it has been analyzed by Okimoto, Daniel I., Between MITI and the Market. Japanese 
Industrial Policy for High Technology, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989 and the effi ciency of this model was 
called into question by Scott, Callon, Divided Sun. MITI and the Breakdown of Japanese High-Tech Industrial Policy, 
1975–1993, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
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with domestic research institutions and universities appears to have played a key role in the case of 
the Japanese precision industry after the war. In order to become a competitive industry on the world 
market, it had to take up the key challenge of its technological improvement. This industrial sector 
benefi ted notably from the support of DAP, whose second chair, occupied by Aoki, was redirected 
towards the needs of precision machine makers in the late 1920s. The development of machine tools 
during World War II offered yet another opportunity to organize cooperation between bureaucrats, 
academics and industrialists. After 1945, it was pursued in the precision machine industry through 
several bodies, mainly the Machine Experiment Station, directed by Okoshi from 1946 onwards. 
Although it was a success in the precision machine industry, this public policy had no impact in 
other sectors of the industry, where technological development relied on cooperation with Western 
multinational enterprises and in-fi rm innovation. Moreover, its impact was time-bound: the Machine 
Experiment Station carried out R&D on cameras, sewing machines and watches only until the 
beginning of the 1950s. Once they had reached a sufficient level of technological development, 
companies began to carry out their own R&D, driven by a climate of keen competition.74 The 
technology and R&D policy of the State can therefore be understood as a strategy to support infant 
industries in their take-off phase. Thus, the actions taken by the State in the interwar period to promote 
the training of engineers and the development of collective R&D directly supported the restructuring 
of the precision machine industry into a competitive industry after 1945.
Finally, the infl uence and role of military engineers in postwar Japan should be discussed. It may 
be attractive to consider the technological development of Japanese industry after 1945 as the result 
of their massive influx into civilian industry. By bringing with them knowledge acquired in top-
universities – especially the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tokyo – and experience 
gained in war production, they made advanced technological know-how available to many private 
companies whose technical level was low at that time. Yet technological knowledge is only a part of 
the process of growth. The military engineers had to face new challenges in private fi rms, these of 
budget constraints, market-oriented management and negotiation with technicians on the shop fl oor 
level.75 Technology gave DAP / DEP graduates a strengthened position within the fi rm but this was not 
an unlimited power.
74 For the example of the camera industry, see Sawai, Minoru, “Kogaku kogyo ni okeru kyodo kenkyu no tenkai: kogaku 
kogyo gijutsu kenkyu kumiai no katsudo wo chushin to shite”, Osaka Economic Papers, Vol. 59 No.3 (2009), pp. 281-
297.
75 Lazonick, William, Competitive Advantage of the Shop Floor, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
